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Abstract. Factoring-based public-key cryptosystems have an overall complexity which is dominated by the
key-production algorithm, which requires the generation of prime numbers. This is most inconvenient in
settings where the key-generation is not an one-off process, e.g., secure delegation of computation or EKE
password-based key exchange protocols. To this end, we extend the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosystem
to a provably secure system, denoted SIS, where the generation of primes is bypassed. By developing on
the correct choice of the parameters of SIS, we align SIS’s security guarantees (i.e., resistance to factoring
of moduli, etc.) to those of other well-known factoring-based cryptosystems. Taking into consideration
different possibilities to implement the fundamental operations, we explicitly compare and contrast the
asymptotic complexity of well-known public-key cryptosystems (e.g., GM and/or RSA) with that of SIS’s.
The latter shows that once we are ready to accept an increase in the size of the moduli, SIS offers a generally
lower asymptotic complexity than, e.g., GM or even RSA (when scaling correctly the number of encrypted
bits). This would yield most significant speed-ups to applications like the aforementioned secure delegation
of computation or protocols where a fresh key needs to be generated with every new session, e.g., EKE
password-based key exchange protocols.
1 Introduction
Setting. Several, widely used public-key cryptosystems have a setup phase where prime numbers are
generated and/or primality tests are run. The computational complexity yielded by the generation of a
prime number of length L is generally in O(L4) and –if optimised– O∼(L3), as we will detail next in this
section. Such generations occur, for instance, in the case of RSA [22] and/or in the Goldwasser-Micali
(GM) probabilistic cryptosystem [8], as each of them defines its operation over Z∗n, for n being a
product of two, distinct large prime numbers generated therein.
Moreover, there exist settings in which the key-generation in asymmetric cryptosystems is not an
one-off process. Such a case is that of the increasingly popular of delegation of computation, where
some client outsources a task, e.g, the solving a linear system, to a remote worker. Secure delegation
protocols [19] are based on homomorphic public-key encryption schemes and in each of the runs of such
a protocol, the keys need to be re-issued freshly. Hence, the asymptotic complexity of prime-generation
for the homomorphic encryptions used therein [19] (e.g., GM, RSA, Paillier’s encryption, encryption
based on bilinear maps, etc.) becomes an alarming bottleneck of the delegated computation. The scheme
that we propose in this paper is homomorphic and it is aimed at overcoming precisely the shortcoming
of such bottlenecks. In this context, in our comparisons, we focus mostly on (homomorphic) schemes
that are commonly used in these settings i.e., factoring-based ones, and do not compare with public-key
cryptosystems different in nature. I.e., we do not refer to the McEliece cryptosystem [18] based on
algebraic codes, which may indeed have faster key-generation procedures; neither do we related to
Diffie-Hellman cryptosystems (e.g., EC-based) for which primes are not key-specific. Such systems
are briefly discussed in Appendix C. Again, we focus on cryptosystems using some primes which are
key-specific. We therefore focus on such public-key cryptosystems in which the key-generations require
primality testing and where the security gravitates around problems related to primality, e.g., factoring
of moduli. More precisely, we extend and compare with the Goldwasser-Micali (GM) probabilistic
cryptosystem [8].
Along with secure delegation of computation, there are other cases in public-key cryptography
where the key-generation are not an one-off process is in the settings of 1. EKE password-based key
exchange [4]; 2. zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge without any setups, where a new commitment
key is used at each session; 3. key agreement with forward secrecy [1]. Thus, we believe that our study
is founded on valid concerns.
Comparisons at a glance. The security of the RSA cryptosystem is based on is the integer prime-
factorisation problem (i.e., the RSA modulus n should be hard-to-factor). Thus, a fair security guarantee
is to take the length L of the modulus n large enough to be considered practically hard-to-factor using,
e.g., the general number field sieve (GNFS) factorisation algorithm [15]. Looking at the complexity of
the latter factorisation for a number of the order 2L and measuring its hardness in the order of 2s (where
s is a security parameter), it is to conclude that a secure length L for the RSA-generated modulus is of
the order of L = O∼(s3) due to the complexity of the GNFS algorithm.
The commonplace implementation of the RSA cryptosystem has a complexity ofO(L4) for the setup
phase, due to prime-generation numbers. And, in general, this is the final complexity of the scheme,
since the encryption and/or decryption processes run in only O(L3). The “schoolbook” multiplication
method of O(L2) can be replaced by “fast multiplication” techniques in the key-generation process, i.e.,
by the Karatsuba algorithm [12] in O(Llog2 3) or by methods [23] based on the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT) in O(L× logL). In the FFT-based optimisation cases, the complexity of RSA is lowered1 to
O∼(L3). This cannot be further improved as primality generating and testing itself does not come
cheap. The prime number theorem states that the probability for an integer randomly selected in the
vicinity of some large integer n to be prime is about 1L , where L is the bitlength of n. In the FFT-
optimised case, the Miller-Rabin primality-testing drops from its standard O(L3) as far as to an overall
complexity of O(L2 logL log logL) = O∼(L2). For the state-of-the-art deterministic primality-testing
method (AKS [3]), the complexity has been shown [17] to be of the order of O(L6). State-of-the-art,
reliable probabilistic tests (elliptic curve primality proving) [14] are computational expensive as well,
i.e., O(L5+ε). Thus, in the best case of FFT-optimisation, primality-testing based cryptosystems would
run in O∼(s9), whilst commonly they would run in O(s12).
The GM cryptosystem is semantically secure under the assumption that the quadratic residuosity
(QR) problem modulo a composite integer n is hard. As in the case of RSA, this modulus n is obtained
as the product of two distinct, freshly generated odd prime numbers. The QR problem stipulates that,
given this modulus n and a number x ∈ Z∗n, when the Jacobi symbol [11] for x ∈ Z∗n with respect to
n is 1, it is difficult to determine whether x is a quadratic residue modulo n (i.e., whether x equals y2
mod n, for some y ∈ Z∗n). If the prime-factorisation of n is known, then the QR problem is easy. In this
context of complexity-analysis, it is to be mentioned that the Jacobi symbol [11] itself generally has
quadratic complexity, as schoolbook multiplication is most often used within. We briefly recall the
GM scheme somewhat more detailedly. In the key-generation algorithm, firstly two different (large)
prime numbers p and q are independently generated. Then, the modulus n is computed as pq. Then,
a non-residue x is found such that its Legendre symbol [11] with respect to p and q are equal to −1,
i.e.,
(
x
p
)
=
(
x
q
)
= −1, whereas the Jacobi symbol with respect to n is 1, i.e., ( xn) = 1. The public
key is defined by the pair (x,n), whereas the prime factors p and q are kept secret. To encrypt a bit b,
an integer y is randomly picked from Z∗n , i.e., y←U Z∗n, and its encryption is calculated as c = y2xb
(mod N). To decrypt, the secret key (p,q) is used and it is to check whether the encrypted value c is a
quadratic residue, i.e., to solve
(
c
p
)
= (−1)b, in the unknown b. Note that if a polynomial adversary
tries to break the cryptosystem on an input x that is a quadratic residue modulo n, then this adversary
1 O∼(t(n)) is equal to O(t(n)× (log t(n))c), for some constant c≥ 0.
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cannot output correctly in more than half of its trials (i.e., in answering whether x is indeed a quadratic
residue). In other words, such an adversary must solve the QR problem to be successful in his attack.
Contribution. In this paper, we endeavour in extending the GM scheme into a public-key scheme
that bypasses prime-generation procedures. The GM scheme has the same aforementioned complexity
bottlenecks. We show reduction in complexity, from the usual O∼(s12) to O∼(s7.5), at the cost of
generating larger, composite numbers (where s is the security parameter). This comes to the special
benefit of applications like the aforementioned (e.g., secure delegation of computation, EKE password-
based key exchange protocols, etc.), where the overwhelming key-generations repeat at each run.
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we present the computational problems relevant to our cryptosystem
and discuss their hardnesses. In Section 3, we describe our cryptosystem denoted SIS. In Section 4,
we discuss the necessary conditions for the selection of parameters and their asymptotic behaviours.
In Section 5, we discuss the complexity of our scheme and compare it to RSA and GM. We provide
experimental results that show that our asymptotic analysis is valid.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we present some essential background to the work herein, the computational problems
that found the basis of our security analyses, and results with respect to their hardness.
2.1 Foundations
Let G be an Abelian group. A character χ is a group homomorphism from (G,+) to C∗. The set of
characters over G has a group structure with component-wise multiplication over C∗. This group is
called the dual group Ĝ of G and it is isomorphic with G [11]. Each character will have an order in this
group. For all a ∈ G, χ(a) is a λ(G)-th root of the unity, where λ(G) is the exponent of the group G.
A character χ of order 2 is such that χ(a) ∈ {−1,1}, for all a ∈ G. Let ε be the trivial character, i.e.,
ε(a) = 1. The set of characters χ for which χ2 = ε consists of ε and characters of order 2.
Let p ∈ Z be an odd prime. The only character in Z∗p of order 2 is the Legendre symbol χ(a) = ( ap),
for any a ∈ Z∗p. For the standard properties of the Legendre symbol, as well as its generalisation to the
Jacobi symbol w.r.t. composed numbers, see [11]. For n = pq with p and q being two different odd
primes, there are 3 characters of order 2: the Legendre symbol ( ·p), the Legendre symbol (
·
q), and the
Jacobi symbol ( ·n). The latter is easy to compute, but the former are allegedly hard to compute when
the primes p and q are unknown. We call these former characters hard characters of order 2.
We recall that QRn is a usual notation for the subgroup of Z∗n of all quadratic residues. We refer to
the problem of deciding whether an element of Z∗n is quadratic residue or not as the QR problem.
The main scope of this paper is to use characters of order 2, in order to design public-key encryption
schemes that elude the generation of prime numbers, thus reducing the general asymptotic complexity
of the usual schemes of the kind.
2.2 Computational Problems
In this paper, we first consider the following combinatorial problem:
CHI Problem (Character Interpolation Problem):
Parameters: a modulus n, x1, . . . ,xt in Z∗n, t elements y1, . . . ,yt ∈ {−1,+1}, all defining a unique
character χ on Z∗n such that χ(xi) = yi for i = 1, . . . , t and t ≥ 1.
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Input: x ∈ Z∗n.
Problem: Find y = χ(x).
An instance of this problem is defined by fixing some parameters and providing a corresponding input
x. Then, it requires the computation of a character of order 2 for a number x ∈ Z∗n, given t elements
in Z∗n and their respective characters. Note that the above problem can be generalised to the case of
characters of order d, i.e., by replacing the set {−1,+1} with a group of order d. Also, observe the
CHI problem can be immediately rewritten as the MOVA2 problem presented in [20].
We now give a combinatorial problem presented in [21]:
GHI Problem (Group Homomorphism Interpolation Problem):
Parameters: G and H two Abelian groups, S be a subset of G×H, r ≥ 1 such that S-interpolates in a
homomorphism between G and H.
Input: r elements x1, . . . ,xr in G.
Problem: Find y1, . . . ,yr ∈ H such that there exists a group homomorphism ϕ such that ϕ(xi) = yi for
i = 1, . . . ,r and ϕ(x) = y for all (x,y) ∈ S.
An instance of the above problem demands that once given r numbers lying in G, one provides r points
in H that together with S interpolate in the group homomorphism ϕ.
Obviously, the CHI problem is a specialisation of the GHI problem in which G = Z∗n, H =
{−1,+1}, r = 1, and the homomorphism is unique.
We recall the following theorem:
Lemma 1. (Lemma 4.3 in [21]) Let G and H be two finite Abelian groups, where the group operation
is denoted additively. We denote by d the order of H. Let x1,x2, . . . ,xr ∈G which span G′. The following
properties are equivalent. In this case, we say that x1,x2, . . . ,xr H-generate G.
– For all y1,y2, . . . ,yr ∈ H, there exists at most one group homomorphism Hom : G→ H such that
Hom(xi) = yi for all 1≤ i≤ r.
– G′+dG = G.
– x1+dG, . . . ,xr +dG span G/dG.
We denote spand(x1, . . . ,xt) = 〈x1, . . . ,xt〉+dG. Then, saying that {x1, . . . ,xt} H-generates for H =
{−1,+1} is equivalent to span2(x1, . . . ,xt) = Z∗n.
When one can compute discrete logarithms in Z∗n, one can easily solve the CHI problem by solving
a linear system. The discrete logarithm is easy when n has only small prime factors. Therefore, for the
CHI problem to be hard, we need that n has large prime factors. This is the case if n is hard-to-factor.
Similarly, when n is easy to factor, we can easily evaluate the characters in certain subgroups of Z∗n,
and therefore solve the CHI problem. For details, an efficient Karp reduction of the CHI problem to
the factorisation problem is present in [20].
Definition 2 (CHI and QR Hardness Assumptions). Given a probabilistic algorithm Gen(1s)→
(n,χ, t) such that χ is a character of order 2, say that the CHI problem is hard relative to Gen if for
every probabilistic algorithm A which is polynomial in s, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
A(x,n,x1, . . . ,xt ,χ(x1), . . . ,χ(xt)) = χ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gen(1s)→ (n,χ, t),
x,x1, . . . ,xt ∈U Z∗n,
span2(x1, . . . ,xt) = Z∗n
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣< negl(s).
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We say that the QR problem is hard relative to Gen if for every probabilistic algorithm A which is
polynomial in s, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr
A(x,n) = 1x∈QRn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
Gen(1s)→ (n),
x ∈U Z∗n,( x
n
)
= 1
− 1
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣< negl(s).
Then, we have the following amplification result.
Lemma 3. Given the parameters n, x1, . . . ,xt ,y1, . . . ,yt for an instance of the CHI problem, i.e.,
defining a unique χ on Z∗n, if A is a probabilistic algorithm which is polynomial in s such that∣∣∣∣Pr [A(x) = χ(x) |x ∈U Z∗n ]− 12
∣∣∣∣> θ,
then one can define an algorithm A ′ calling A a number of 12θ
−2 ln 2ε times such that
Pr
[
A ′(x) = χ(x) |x ∈U Z∗n
]≥ 1− ε,
with θ> 0 and ε> 0.
Due to space constraints, we present the proof of the above in the appendix.
Now assume a ppt. algorithm GenGM which generates a modulus n = pq as in the Goldwasser-
Micali cryptosystem [8] and t > 1, i.e., GenGM(1s)→ (n). We define GenCHI(1s)→ (n,( ·p), t), given
that we have GenGM(1s)→ (n), p being one of the two prime factors of n selected at random, and t = 2.
We can then see that the hardness of quadratic residuosity implies the hardness of the CHI problem
relative to GenGM. Formally, this is proven below.
Theorem 4. If the QR problem is hard relative to GenGM, then CHI problem is hard relative to
GenCHI .
Due to space constraints, we present the proof of the above in Appendix A, page 15.
In this paper, we use the CHI problem with χ(·) = ( ·α) over Z∗n, for a factor α of n. For the CHI
problem to be hard, α must be a hard factor of n. So, we tune our parameters to ensure this. So far, we
know no algorithm better than finding α to solve the CHI problem. So, we believe that our selection
method is enough to guaranty security.
3 SIS: A Primeless Public-Key Cryptosystem
Our proposed scheme, denoted SIS, is described below. We assume a security parameter s. Based on
s, other parameters of SIS will be defined: t, k, and `. The exact way to choose these parameters (in
order to ensure the security of SIS) is discussed in Section 4.
3.1 The Core of the Cryptosystem
In Algorithm 1, we describe the key generation procedure of our SIS cryptosystem. As usual, the
procedure runs in the security parameter s. Algorithm 1 generates and uses within a parameter denoted
t, which will have its expression in this security parameter s made clear in the next section.
This key generation procedure produces a pair (α,n) of integers such that α is an odd factor of
n. We note that the value n is part of the public key, whereas the integer α is kept secret. Therefore,
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the Jacobi symbol ( ·α) is a character of order 2 in Z
∗
n. Then, in the generation procedure, t values,
x1,x2, . . . ,xt , are randomly picked from Z∗n. Using the Jacobi symbol ( .α), the values yi are computed as
( xiα ), for all 1≤ i≤ t. If all yi’s are equal to 1, the all the xi values are dropped and the procedure restarts
by choosing again all these values, in the same fashion. (In any case, this occurrence of re-starting is
rare: it happens with a probability close to 2−t ; there are rare cases where all yi’s are always 1, i.e.,
when α is a square.)
1: Input: Security parameter s.
Output: Public key: (n,x1,x2, . . .xt ,y1,y2, . . .yt); Private key: α.
2: compute t, k, and ` depending on s, as per (1) in p. 9 and (2)-(4) in p. 10
3: pick random odd integers αi and βi of size `, i = 1, . . . ,k;
4: compute α= α1×·· ·×αk
5: compute β= β1×·· ·×βk
6: compute n = α ·β
7: pick x1,x2, . . . ,xt ∈U Z∗n
8: compute yi = ( xiα ) for all 1≤ i≤ t
9: if yi = 1 for all 1≤ i≤ t, then go-to step 3
Algorithm 1: SIS: Key generation
Intuitively, we could expect that taking k = 1 would be the optimal option. We will see in the
analysis in the next section that there is an advantage in taking k larger.
In Algorithm 2 below, we show how to encrypt a bit b using our SIS cryptosystem. From the
1: Input: a bit b.
Public key: (n,x1,x2, . . .xt ,y1,y2, . . .yt).
Output: the encryption z, z ∈ Z∗n.
2: find yi =−1, i ∈ {1, . . . , t}
3: pick b1,b2, . . . ,bi−1,bi+1, . . . ,bt ∈U {0,1}
4: compute P =∏ j 6=i y
b j
j
5: if P = (−1)b then bi← 0 else bi← 1.
6: compute z′ = xb11 · · ·xbtt (mod n)
7: pick r ∈U Z∗n
8: compute z = r2 · z′ (mod n)
Algorithm 2: SIS: Encryption
public values yi, the encryption procedure firstly selects t bits such that ∏i y
bi
i = (−1)b. The value
z = r2× xb11 · · ·xbtt (mod n) is computed, where the number r is randomly picked. The result denotes
the ciphertext of the bit b. Having got the ciphertext z and knowing value α, one decrypts z by solving
(−1)b = ( zα), where ( zα) is the Jacobi symbol of z with respect to α. This is presented in Algorithm 3.
Correctness. The encryption scheme the SIS cryptosystem is correct, i.e., if z is the encryption of a bit
b as above, then the participant A decrypts z to b, provided that he knows the secret value α. To see
this, we give the following lemma.
6
1: Input: the encryption z, z ∈ Z∗n.
Secret key: α.
Output: a bit b.
2: compute ( zα ).
3: if ( zα ) = 1 then b = 0 else b = 1 .
Algorithm 3: SIS: Decryption
Lemma 5. ( zα) = (−1)b, where the values z, α, the bit b are honestly computed/selected as in the
SIS cryptosystem.
Proof. From z = r2xb11 · · ·xbtt (mod n) as in the scheme and α a divisor of n, it follows that z =
r2xb11 · · ·xbtt (mod α). Using the standard properties for the Legendre symbol, we obtain that the value
( zα) that A finally calculates is as follows:
( zα)= (
r2xb11 ···xbtt
α ) = (
r
α)
2( x1α )
b1 · · ·( xtα )bt = 1 · yb11 yb22 · · ·ybtt = (−1)b. uunionsq
3.2 Security Analysis
It is clear that to perform a secret key recovery attack, an attacker needs to find the factor α of n. So,
SIS strongly relies on the factoring problem.
Take now the goal of the adversary to be guessing whether b is 0 or 1. We follow the standard lines
in saying that our cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure if for every polynomial adversary A outputting a bit
b′, its an advantage AdvA(s) = Prα,n,X ,B[b = b′]− 12 is negligible in terms of s, where n and α are the
modulus used and its secret factor generated in the scheme, b is the encrypted bit, X and B respectively
denote the values xi and bi that are picked during a run of the scheme.
We easily conclude that the scheme is semantically secure (i.e., IND-CPA secure).
Let a ppt. algorithm Gen such that Gen(1s)→ (n,χ, t) with χ(·) = ( ·α) as per our system.
Corollary 6. Assuming that the CHI problem is hard relative to Gen, the SIS scheme is IND-CPA
secure.
Proof. It follows from the definition of hardness of the CHI problem in Section 2.2, Lemma 3 and the
construction of the SIS scheme, i.e., the bit that an A is supposed to output correctly to break IND-CPA
security is the character ( zα), where z is generated in Algorithm 2 and α is the secret generated at the
setup phase. uunionsq
Thus, we reduced the IND-CPA security of the SIS scheme to the hardness of the CHI problem (which
is assumed to be hard). As aforementioned, the next sections expand on the hardness of the factorisation
problem for n, a modulus generated as in the SIS scheme.
Since the SIS-scheme is homomorphic, it is clearly not IND-CCA secure.
4 Selection of the Parameters
In the first part of this section (i.e., in Subsection 4.1), let us assume that the parameters k and ` are
chosen and we attempt to gauge the right choice for t.
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4.1 The Local Parameter t
Let s ∈ Z be the security parameter and L = 2k` be the bitlength of n. We pick the value t such that we
obtain the uniqueness of the homomorphism in the GHI corresponding problem. Namely, we pick t to
be greater than the value r specified by Lemma 1, specialised here for d = 2.
We state the following result from [21].
Theorem 7. (Theorem 4.29 in [21]) Let G, H be some Abelian groups, and d the order of H. The
probability Pgen that some elements g1, . . . ,gs ∈U G picked uniformly at random H-generate G satisfies
Pgen ≥ ∏
q∈Pd
(
1− q
kq−1
(q−1) ·qs
)
,
where Pd is the set of all prime factors of gcd(#G,d) and kq is the rank of the maximal q-subgroup of
G. (Given a prime q, the q-subgroup of G is the subgroup Aq of elements whose order are powers of q.
The rank kq is the integer such that there exists a unique sequence of integers aq,1 ≤ ·· · ≤ aq,kq such
that Aq is isomorphic to Zqaq,1 ⊕·· ·⊕Zqaq,kq ).
To apply the above theorem to our case, we give the following corollary.
Corollary 8. The probability that {x1, . . . ,xt} in the SIS scheme Z2-generates Z∗n is
Pgen ≥ 1−2k2−t ,
where k2 is the rank of the group A2 and A2 is the maximal 2-subgroup of Z∗n.
In order to enforce that 1−Pgen is smaller than 2−s, we get a sufficient bound for t: i.e., t ≥ k2+ s.
Further, the rank k2 of the 2-subgroup of Z∗n is closely related to ω(n), i.e., the number of distinct
prime factors of n [9]. More precisely the relation is as follows.
Lemma 9. The rank k2 of the 2-subgroup of Z∗n is:
ω(n), if n is odd or (4 divides n and 8 does not divide n)
ω(n)−1, if 2 divides n and 4 does not divide n
ω(n)+1, if 8 divides n
Proof. We write n as ∏ri=1 p
αi
i ×2α0 , where pi are different, odd primes. Then, by properties of Abelian
groups, Z∗n is isomorphic with the group ∏ri=1 Z∗pαii
×Z∗2α0 . The group Z∗pαii is cyclic of 2-rank equal to
1, for each pi as above. The group Z∗2α0 is: either the trivial group, hence of 2-rank equal to 0 (if α0 = 0
or α0 = 1); or Z2, hence of 2-rank equal to 1 (if α0 = 2); or of 2-rank equal to 2 (if α0 > 2). Since the
2-rank of a product is the sum of the 2-ranks, we compute the 2-rank of Z∗n in terms of r. We conclude
with the fact that ω(n) = r if n is odd and ω(n) = r+1, otherwise. uunionsq
So, since n to be generated in the SIS scheme is odd, we conclude the number t of elements used
from Z∗n to generate z′ is such that t ≥ ω(n)+ s. This is a sufficient condition for Pgen ≥ 1−2−s.
Corollary 10. For t ≥ ω(n)+ s, x1, . . . ,xt Z2-generate Z∗n with a probability greater than or equal to
1−2−s.
8
By the Ramanujan-Hardy theorem [9], the average number ω(m) of distinct prime factors of a random
number m is ln(lnm). Further, by the Erdo¨s-Kac theorem [6] says that ω(m)−ln lnm√
ln lnm
follows the stan-
dard normal distribution, for such a random number m. So, Pr
[
ω(m)> ln lnm+
√
2s. ln2. ln lnm
]
is
F(−√2s. ln2), where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
We can apply the arguments above using the numbers αi and βi that the Key generation algorithm
produces. Namely, first see that ω(n)≤ Σ2ki=1(ω(αi)+ω(βi)). So, we can bound the mean of the variable
ω(n) with that expected value 2k× ln ln`. So,
Pr
[
ω(n)≥ 2k× ln ln2`+
√
2s× ln2×2k× ln ln2`
]
≤ F(−
√
2s. ln2).
Since F(−x) can be approximated with 1√
2pie
−x2
2 /x, then the probability is smaller than 1√
4pis ln2
2−s.
Thus, all things considered, we can take:
t =
⌈
2k ln ln2`+
√
2s. ln2.2k. ln ln2`+ s
⌉
. (1)
Hence, t can be taken of the order of
√
s · k · log`+ s. The final estimation of t asymptotically in s will
be clear at the end of this section, after we see exactly how k and ` vary in s.
Note: As one can see, one dominant component in the asymptotic expression (1) of t is the standard
deviation of the random variable characterising ω(n), i.e., in the term
√
2s. ln2.2k. ln ln2`. We ran
several experiments with smaller α’s and β’s and we observed that in practice this standard deviation is
in fact smaller than
√
2k× ln(ln(2`)) and even smaller than the value2 of√ln(2k` ln2). So, in practice,
t could potentially be taken smaller than the asymptotic approximation proven here.
4.2 The Local Parameters k and `
It can be seen (as developed in Section 3.2) that in order for the CHI problem to be hard and, separately
for key recovery attacks to be impossible, the factorisation of the modulus n, generated as in our
cryptosystem, needs to be hard. More precisely, the factors α and β of n must be hard to find.
Let n be a positive integer and let its unique prime decomposition be as follows: n = n1n2 · · ·nv,
with n1 ≥ n2 ≥ . . .≥ nv. In [13], Knuth et al. look at the probability that, for a random number n, the
rth largest of its prime factors, nr, is smaller than nx where 0< x< 1. We recall some commonplace
notations describing this:
– Fr(x) = limN→+∞ Pr(x,N)N , where Pr(x,N) = #{1≤ n≤ N|nr ≤ Nx};
– ψ(x,y) = P1
(
logy
logx ,x
)
is the de Brujin function [10] and the ratio ψ(x,y)/x can be interpreted as
the probability that an integer chosen at random in the interval [1,x] has all its prime factors smaller
than or equal to y. This function has several approximations [10,13].
– Thus, F1(x) = limN→+∞ ψ(N,N
x)
N = ρ(1/x) where ρ is Dickman’s function. Since ρ(u)≤ 1u! , we use
a convenient upper bound (F1(x))−1 ≥ 1x !. In [26], van de Lune and Wattel provide a numerical
table for ρ(u) when u is large.
We express our security desiderata (the hardness on n’s factorisation); to do so, we will use some
value x ∈ (0,1). To ease our explanations, we start by recalling the complexities of factoring with
elliptic curves, ECM and with the generalised number sieves, GNFS.
2 This would be the standard deviation predicted by the Erdo¨s-Kac theorem, if the latter were applicable directly to an n
generated like ours.
9
– The complexity of factoring n with GNFS [15] is in O(e
(
3
√
64
9 +o(1)
)
(lnn)
1
3 (ln lnn)
2
3
); so given the
constants c,ε ∈ R we define a function CGNFS(L,c,ε) = c× (e
(
3
√
64
9 +ε
)
(ln2L)
1
3 (ln ln2L)
2
3
.
We take for granted that CGNFS(1248)≈ 280 [2]. We deduce that we can reasonably take ε≈ 0 and
c≈ 2−14. In what follows, CGNFS(L) =CGNFS(L,c,ε).
– The complexity of factoring a number n with ECM [16] is in O(e
√
2+o(1)
√
ln p ln ln p), where p is the
smallest factor of n and |p| ≈ ln pln2 is the bitlength of p; so we define a function CECM(L,c′,ε′) =
c′× e
√
2+ε′
√
ln2L ln ln2L . In what follows, CECM(L) =CECM(L,2−14,0) as in CGNFS. So, even though
one would find all factors of n of length smaller than x`, one would not isolate α.
Now, we impose our conditions to align the security of SIS to the security levels of factoring
moduli in general, in public-key cryptography. First, we impose equation (2). This equation stipulates
that factors of n with no divisors of size less than x` are hard to find with ECM. There is one such
factor in αi, respectively in βi, with probability 1−F1(x). Equation (4) ensures that we have at least k′
of such factors in n and at least one in α or in β, respectively. Equation (3) means that the product of
hard-to-find factors is also hard to factor with GNFS.
CECM(x`) ≥ 2s (2)
CGNFS(k′x`) ≥ 2s (3)
k′−1
∑
i=0
(
2k
i
)
F1(x)2k−i(1−F1(x))i+2
k
∑
i=k′
(
k
i
)
F1(x)2k−i(1−F1(x))i ≤ 2−s (4)
The latter condition would approximate to
(
2k
k′
)
F1(x)2k−k
′+1+2F1(x)k ≤ 2−s, where the second term
could be neglected for k′ > k. Practically, using SAGE [25], we derive the following parameters.
s 80 128 192 256 320 384 448 512
x 0.0561 0.0654 0.0653 0.0652 0.0651 0.0574 0.0585 0.0593
k 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7
k′ 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 8
` 10978 16553 31080 50143 73204 117776 145499 181116
k′x` 1232 3248 8118 16347 28593 40562 59581 85921
2k` 21956 66212 186480 401144 732040 1177760 1745988 2535624
t 143 247 379 512 648 743 880 1018
We recall that 2k` is the modulus size and that k′x` would be the modulus size for GM or RSA with
equivalent security.
Interpreting the optimised parameters. For instance, with s = 128, the probability that αi resp. βi is
2x`-smooth is F1(x)≈ 2−65.3 and the probability that we do not have at least 3 non-smooth factors out
of 2k = 4 is 2−128.0. So, we could count on at least 3 factors with no prime divisor of length lower than
x`, i.e., on a hard-to-factor integer of 3x` bits.
On choosing k. Asymptotically, we can take x ∼ log logslogs , k ∼ slogs , k′ = uk given a constant u, and
`∼ s2. Clearly, (2)-(3) are satisfied. We have
(
2k
k′
)
≤ 22k. By using F1(x)−1 ≥ 1x !, we can show that
F1(x)−1 ≥ sO(1), so
(
2k
k′
)
F1(x)2k−k
′+1 ≤ 2−s by tuning u appropriately. This makes sure that (4) is
satisfied. So, we have 2k` ∈ O (s3(logs)−1). Since we already showed that t ∈ O(√s.k. log`+ s),
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obtain t ∈ O (s). We recall that (according to the note on page 9) experiments indicate that this could
be a pessimistic approximation of t and suggest that, in practice, t could be taken smaller.
In contrast, k = 1 and k′ = 2 leads us to x ∈ O
(
logs
s
)
then to 2k` = O
(
s4(logs)−3
)
which is
asymptotically larger than before. So, there is an advantage in taking k larger than 1 (which was maybe
not intuitive to begin with).
5 Complexity of the Scheme
5.1 Asymptotic Complexity
In the modulus-generation phase, 2k integers of size ` are randomly picked and 2k−1 multiplications
are performed, in order to obtain the value n. Using a divide and conquer strategy, these operations
are performed in O(2k`+Σi2iCmul(alg, k`2i )), i = 0,1, . . . , log2 2k−1, where Cmul(alg, `) denotes the
complexity of multiplying numbers of ` bits using a particular algorithm, i.e., Cmul(schoolbook, `) =
O(`2), Cmul(Karatsuba, `) =O(`log2 3), Cmul(FFT-optimised, `) =O(` log`). In the next, “sch.” denotes
the schoolbook multiplication and “FFT ” denotes the FFT-based multiplication algorithm [23].
Thus, the complexity of modulus generation in SIS, O(SIS-Gen), is
O(2k`+Σi2iCmul(alg,
k`
2i
)) =
{
O(2k`+Σlog2 2k−1i=0
(k`)2
2i ) = O((k`)
2), if alg is sch.
O(2k`+Σlog2 2k−1i=0 2i
k`
2i log
k`
2i ) = O(k` logk`), if alg is FFT.
As we will see, this is dominated by what remains in the key generation.
Indeed, the choices for the values xi from Z∗n and the computation of the values yi are done in
O(2tk`+ tCJac(alg,2k`)), where CJac(alg,x) denotes the complexity to calculate the Jacobi symbol
on an input of two x-bit integers, using the algorithm alg for the multiplication needed inside the
calculation of the symbol. We know that CJac(alg,L) = Cmul(alg,L) logL, for L being a size of the
inner modulus. Thus, this complexity amounts to
O(2tk`+tCJac(alg,2k`))=O(2tk`+tCmul(alg,2k`) logk`)=
{
O(t× (k`)2 logk`), if alg is sch.
O(t× (k`)(logk`)2), if alg is FFT.
For encryption, one picks t bits and performs at most t +1 multiplications to compute z, which
takes O(tCmul(alg,2k`)). The value P is then computed within a complexity of order O(t) as each
yi value is from {+1,−1} and each value bi is from {0,1}. Similarly to the above, this gives a total
complexity of SIS of the order of
{
O(t× (k`)2), if alg is sch.
O(t× (k`) logk`), if alg is FFT.
For decryption, we need to compute one Jacobi symbol, thus spending CJac(alg,k`) on the proce-
dure. This implies a complexity of
{
O((k`)2 logk`), if alg is sch.
O((k`)(logk`)2), if alg is FFT.
By SIS-s, we denote the SIS cryptosystem over the domain {0,1}s, in which –of course– the
encryption and decryption have an overhead factor of s. We do consider s-bit messages since, while
having a security 2s, one would be interested in encrypting a symmetric key of s bits to use a consistent
security level in hybrid encryption. Once again, we recall that (according to the note on page 9) actual
complexities may be lowered if we found tighter approximation of t.
We would now like to compare our complexity with the complexity of the GM scheme that we
extend herein, as well as to that of other public-key cryptosystems based on primality-testing, e.g., RSA.
Given the existent optimised implementations of RSA (based mainly on optimised multiplications),
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we will consider the most expensive multiplication algorithm, e.g., schoolbook multiplication, as well
as the cheapest multiplication one, e.g., FFT-based. We extend this reasoning for the case where we
consider the GM cryptosystem too. We recall that the bottleneck of RSA/GM, if the key-generation is
considered, is indeed the prime-generation.
An additional fact to consider in this comparison is that –in general– the key-generation in public-
key cryptosystem is a one-time process, i.e., one generates the keys once and encrypts/decrypts several
times. An exception to this case is, as we mentioned in the introduction, the context of secure delegation
of linear algebra computation, where some client outsources e.g, the solving a linear system, to a
remote worker; in these cases, the secure delegation protocols require re-generation of each run of the
secret/public keys. Outside this setting, it is compelling to consider separately the case of the complexity
of RSA without the key generation and draw a corresponding comparison with the complexity of th
system herein, i.e., to compare the complexity of solely the encryption-decryption part of RSA with
the SIS cryptosystems.
Another thing to bare in mind in this comparative study is that the SIS cryptosystem in its presented
form encrypts a single bit. The GM system has also a “bit-by-bit” fashion. So, if we were to compare
SIS asymptotically with the RSA that encrypts s bits at once, then we ought to consider s encryptions
of the SIS cryptosystem.
For this comparison, we take the asymptotic values k` ∈ O (s3(logs)−1) and t ∈ O(s 32 (logs)− 12)
that we obtained. We consider the GM cryptosystem first. By looking carefully at the complexity of the
GM cryptosystem (see Section B.1), one can conclude with Table 1.
Table 1: Asymptotic Complexities in Security Parameter s for GM vs. SIS
key-generation encryption decryption
schoolbook multiplication GM O(s12(logs)−8) O(s6(logs)−4) O(s6(logs)−5)
SIS O(s7(logs)−1) O(s7(logs)−2) O(s6)
FFT-based multiplication GM O(s9(logs)−5) O(s3(logs)−1) O(s3)
SIS O(s4(logs)) O(s4) O(s3 logs)
We consider now the RSA cryptosystem. To assess the asymptotic complexity of RSA, we make the
following distinction. On the one hand, one can assume a random full-size e. Let us denote this as RSA.
On the other hand, one can take the public exponent of RSA as a constant, e.g., e = 216+1, in which
case we will refer to using RSAe cte.. In the latter case, in the encryption, there are O(1) multiplications.
By looking carefully at the complexity of the RSA cryptosystem (see Section B.2), we can wrap
the complexity comparison between RSA and SIS-s in Table 2.
5.2 Experimental Results
To assess the correctness of our analysis, we implemented and compared the running time of RSA
and SIS-s. The experimental environment consists of a Linux kernel 3.2.0-31 that runs on a Intel
Xeon 3.33Ghz CPU. The implementation was done in C and for our large numbers we use the GMP
library [7]. The implementations of both SIS-s and RSA were tested for the same security parameters
illustrated in the table from page 10, namely s varies from 80 to 512.
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Table 2: Asymptotic Complexities in Security Parameter s for RSAe cte. vs. SIS
key-generation encryption decryption
schoolbook multiplication RSAe cte. O(s12(logs)−8) O(s6(logs)−4) O(s9(logs)−6)
RSA O(s12(logs)−8) O(s9(logs)−6) O(s9(logs)−6)
SIS-s O(s7(logs)−1) O(s8(logs)−2) O(s7)
FFT-based multiplication RSAe cte. O(s9(logs)−5) O(s3(logs)−1) O(s6(logs)−3)
RSA O(s9(logs)−5) O(s6(logs)−3) O(s6(logs)−3)
SIS-s O(s4(logs)) O(s5) O(s4 logs)
SIS-s implementation. Our implementation verifies the asymptotic complexities we provide in Table 2.
In practice, if we compute the slope of the regression line for the logarithmic running time of key
generation, encryption and decryption against logs, we get 5.7 for the key generation, 6.2 for the
encryption and 6.0 for the decryption algorithm. Indeed these values are slightly smaller than the ones
in Table 2 as GMP has efficient implementations of its operations, e.g., multiplication or computation
of the Jacobi symbol.
Comparing RSA and SIS-s. Besides verifying that the asymptotic complexity of SIS-s is valid, we
are also interested in comparing the running time of RSA and SIS-s for the generation of the key. As
aforementioned, this represents the bottleneck for RSA and our scheme tries to offer a speed up for
those scenarios, like secure delegation of computation, where the key generation is not an one-off
process.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Key generation SIS-s vs. RSA
The above figures illustrate both the running time (Figure 1a) and the logarithmic running time
(Figure 1b) of the key generation for RSA and SIS-s, where the security parameter s takes values
between 80 and 512. The running time is measured in seconds. For small values of s, the generation
of primes for RSA is faster than our primeless method. But one may notice that once we increase the
value of the security parameter the two plots intersect at around s = 300 and clearly the key generation
of our SIS-s becomes faster than the one of RSA. This behaviour reinforces our asymptotic study.
We conclude that, by comparison with GM and RSA, SIS exhibits improved asymptotic com-
plexities for all procedures, apart from encryption. The result is sustained also by our experimental
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results. This would solve the bottlenecks of the execution of secure delegation of computation and/or
EKE password-based key exchange [4], i.e., of all settings where the key-generation is not an one-off
process.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, using the same, main idea of relying on hard characters of order 2, we have extended
the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem in a way that bypasses completely the use/generation of prime
numbers. In doing so, the resulting scheme has a complexity asymptotically smaller than the one of
standard public-key cryptosystems. This would yield a considerable speed-up to secure delegation
protocols [19] that use homomorphic encryption schemes, GM included, in a way where the key-
generation is repeated at every run of the protocol.
It is possible to improve the efficiency of our cryptosystem by using characters of higher order. For
instance for characters of order 4, with the quartic residue symbol, the two participants can encrypt two
bits instead of one. In this scenario, participant A is choosing βi and αi to be Gaussian integers and
computes n as ∏iαi · α¯i ·βi · β¯i, where γ¯i is simply the complex-conjugate of a Gaussian integer γi. The
B participant is now choosing the values bi from {0,1,2,3}. The correctness and the security proof of
this optimised scheme are maintained (i.e., similar to the case of our cryptosystem, with reductions
to the MOVA4 and a different proof on the distribution spawned by the values z generated in such
a scheme). However, the complexity of a scheme thus-wise optimised is higher than the one herein
presented.
Still, using only characters of order 2, our cryptosystem can be extended so that it directly encrypts
more than 1 bit by using algebraic codes. This extension is not the subject of this paper, being left for
future work.
As future work, we would also like to study further the optimisation problem on our parameters,
implied by our computational hardness constraints. It would be interesting to study from closer the
standard deviation of ω(n), to find a tighter asymptotic approximation of t.
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A Proofs
Theorem 3. Given n, x1, . . . ,xt ,y1, . . . ,yt defining a unique χ on Z∗n, if A is a probabilistic algorithm
which is polynomial in s such that∣∣∣∣Pr [A(x) = χ(x) |x ∈U Z∗n ]− 12
∣∣∣∣> θ,
then an algorithm A ′ calling A a number of 12θ
−2 ln 2ε times can be defined such that
Pr
[
A ′(x) = χ(x) |x ∈U Z∗n
]≥ 1− ε,
with θ> 0 and ε> 0.
Proof. Let A be a probabilistic algorithm which is polynomial in s. Let
p = Pr [A(x) = χ(x)|x ∈U Z∗n]
We define the following algorithm A ′(x):
1: initialize c1← 0 and c2← 0
2: for i = 1 to k do
3: pick some random bits b1, . . . ,bt and r ∈U Z∗n
4: set x′← xxb11 · · ·xbtt r2 mod n
5: c1← c1+A(x′)yb11 · · ·ybtt
6: pick some random bits b1, . . . ,bt and r ∈U Z∗n
7: set x′← xb11 · · ·xbtt r2 mod n
8: c2← c2+A(x′)yb11 · · ·ybtt
9: end for
10: output the sign of c1c2
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Since p 6= 12 , we observe that x′ at step 7 is uniformly distributed in Z∗n and such that χ(x′) = yb11 · · ·ybtt .
For this, see Lemma 11 given below.
So, c2 is incremented with probability p and decremented with probability 1− p. Due to the
Chernoff bound [5], the final value of c2 has the sign of p− 12 with probability at least 1− e−2k(p−
1
2 )
2
.
Similarly, c1 multiplied by the sign of p− 12 will have the sign of χ(x) with probability at least
1− e−2k(p− 12 )2 .
So, the algorithm produces the correct value of χ(x) with probability at least 1−2e−2k(p− 12 )2 .
By taking k = 12θ
−2 ln 2ε and since |p− 12 |> θ, we attain the required probability of “success” for
the algorithm A ′ thus-wise constructed, where ε is the “error” in the text of the theorem.
uunionsq
Lemma 11 (Lemma 4.16 in [21]). Let G and H be two finite Abelian groups. We denote by d the order
of H, where the group operation is denoted additively. Let x1,x2, . . . ,xr ∈ G. If x1, . . . ,xt H-generate
G then by picking r ∈U dG and b1, . . . ,bt ∈U {0, . . . ,d− 1} then dr+ b1x1 + · · ·+ btxt is uniformly
distributed.
Theorem 4. If the QR problem is hard relative to GenGM , then CHI problem is hard relative to GenCHI .
Proof. Let A be an adversary against CHI. Let GenQR(1s)→ (n). We pick one of the two hard
characters χ at random. Let
pn = Pr[A(x,n,x1,x2,χ(x1),χ(x2)) = χ(x)|n,span2(x1,x2) = Z∗n]
over x,x1,x2 ∈U Z∗n and χ. Due to the definition of GenCHI , what we have to prove is that E(pn) is
negligible when the QR problem is hard relative to GenQR.
We construct an adversary B(u,n) against QR as follows. By definition, we have (u/n) =+1. Then,
we pick v ∈U Z∗n until (v/n) =−1 and σ ∈U {−1,+1}. Let χ be the only hard character of Z∗n of order
2 such that χ(v) = σ. Clearly, χ is a uniformly distributed hard character. Then, we select bits a,b,c,d
until
∣∣∣∣a bc d
∣∣∣∣ is odd. Finally, r,r′ ∈U Z∗n. We define x1 = uavbr2 mod n and x2 = ucvd(r′)2 mod n.
The residue u is quadratic if and only if χ(u) = +1. When it is not, then span2(u,v) = Z∗n. In
that case, (x1,x2) is randomly distributed over the pairs such that span2(x1,x2) = Z∗n. Still in the
case that χ(u) =−1, we note that χ(x1) = (−1)aσb, χ(x2) = (−1)cσd . Let x = uαvβ(r′′)2 mod n with
α,β ∈U {0,1} and r′′ ∈U Z∗n. Clearly, x is uniformly distributed in Z∗n and χ(x) = (−1)ασβ. Thanks to
the good distributions, we have
Pr[A(x,n,x1,x2,(−1)aσb,(−1)cσd) = (−1)ασβ|n,χ(u) =−1] = pn
In the case χ(u) = +1, the inputs to A are independent from α. So, the above probability becomes 12 .
We define
B(u,n) = 1A(x,n,x1,x2,(−1)aσb,(−1)cσd)6=(−1)ασβ
Clearly, for (u/n) =−1, we have Pr[B(u,n) = 0|n] = pn. For (u/n) =−1, we have Pr[B(u,n) = 1|n] =
1
2 . So,
Pr[B(u,n) = 1u∈QRn ] =
1
4
+
E(pn)
2
Assuming that the QR problem is hard relative to GenQR, we obtain that
∣∣∣E(pn)2 − 14 ∣∣∣ is negligible.
Therefore, |E(pn)− 12 | is negligible as well. Since this holds for all A , we deduce that the CHI problem
is hard relative to GenCHI .
uunionsq
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B Detailed Complexity Comparison
B.1 The Complexity of Goldwasser-Micali Cryptosystem
We start by considering the GM cryptosystem, namely the encryption/decryption of one bit under GM.
We take L = O(s3(logs)−2). In the key-setup stage, generating the GM-modulus N as a product of two
primes p, q with |p|= |q|= L takes O(L2×Cmul(alg,L)) and computing the Jacobi symbol needed has
a complexity CJac(alg,2L) =Cmul(alg,2L) log2L. The GM-encryption has the asymptotic complexity
of Cmul(alg,2L) (it does two or three multiplications modulo N). The GM-decryption algorithm for
one bit has the complexity of CJac(alg,2L) =Cmul(alg,2L) log2L. Thus, we have
O(GM key-generation) =
{
O(L4) = O(s12(logs)−8), with sch. multiplication
O(L3 logL) = O(s9(logs)−5), with FFT-based multiplication
O(GM encryption) =
{
O(4×L2) = O(s6(logs)−4), with sch. multiplication
O(2×L× log2L) = O(s3(logs)−1), with FFT-based multiplication
O(GM decryption) =
{
O(4×L2× log2L) = O(s6(logs)−5), with sch. multiplication
O(2×L× (log2L)2) = O(s3), with FFT-based multiplication
B.2 The Complexity of the RSA Cryptosystem
We now consider the RSA cryptosystem. We take L=O(s3(logs)−2). We start with the RSA decryption.
To exponentiate to the power an exponent b of size L in bits, we do O(L×Cmul(alg,L)), which gives
O(L3), if schoolbook multiplication is used and O(L2 logL), if FFT-based multiplication is used. So,
O(RSA decryption) =
{
O(L3) = O(s9(logs)−6), with schoolbook multiplication
O(L2 logL) = O(s6(logs)−3), with FFT-based multiplication.
We can take two views on the RSA encryption. On the one hand, one can assume that the exponen-
tiation in the RSA encryption is not done in constant number of multiplications, by having chosen a
constant public exponent e. Let us denote this as RSA. Thus, for a choice of the public RSA exponent
e lying indeed in Z∗φ(n), one get O(RSAencryption) = O(RSAdecryption). On the other hand, one
can take the public exponent of RSA as a constant, in which case we will refer to using RSAe cte.. Then,
O(RSAe cte.encryption)=Cmul(alg,L)=
{
O(L2) = O(s6(logs)−4), with schoolbook multiplication
O(L logL) = O(s3(logs)−1), with FFT-based multiplication.
The RSA key-generation runs in O(L× 2× L2 ×Cmul(alg,L)). So, O(RSA key-generation) ={
O(s12(logs)−8), with schoolbook multiplication
O(s9(logs)−5), with FFT-based multiplication
C Other Cryptosystems, Not Essentially Prime-Based
If working with elliptic curves, the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem for the group E(Fq)
of elliptic curves over a finite field Fq, where q = pk and p is a prime, is judged by the number of
points on the generated curves; algorithms [24] for point-counting run at in O(N
2Cmul(alg,N2)
logN ) where
N = logq, Cmul(alg, `) denotes the complexity of multiplying numbers of ` bits using a particular
algorithm. This complexity can be approximated to O(N4+o(1)), which asymptotically in a security
parameter s can be approximated to O(s6). This method yields smaller key-lengths than in the case of
RSA, the bottleneck of the time-complexity is reduced, yet the space complexity needed is of the space
complexity is O(N4 logN), hence still of around O(s6).
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Less used asymmetric cryptosystems, e.g., the McEliece cryptosystem [18] based on algebraic
codes, are faster than traditional lines and have a better security increase with the growth of the key-
length. Nevertheless, the McEliece private and public keys are large matrices of the order of 5∗105 bits.
Numerically, this size proves to be much larger than that the key in the cryptosystem herein proposed.
McEliece is interestingly still asymptotically faster than standard public-key cryptography lines.
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